These and related considerations have sparked some to develop analternative conception of autonomy meant to replace allegedly overlyindividualistic notions. This replacement has been called“relational autonomy” (MacKenzie and Stoljar,2000a). Spurred by feminist critiques of traditional conceptions ofautonomy and rights (Nedelsky, 1989, Code, 1991), relationalconceptions of autonomy stress the ineliminable role that relatednessplays in both persons' self- conceptions, relative to which autonomymust be defined, and the dynamics of deliberation and reasoning. Theseviews offer a provocative alternative to traditional models of theautonomous individual, but it must be made clear what position isbeing taken on the issue: on the one hand, relational accounts can betaken as resting on a non-individualist conception of the person andthen claim that insofar as autonomy is self-government and the self isconstituted by relations with others, then autonomy is relational; orthese accounts may be understood as claiming that whatever selves turnout to be, autonomy fundamentally involves social relations ratherthan individual traits (Oshana, 2006). Some such views also waiverbetween claiming that social and personal relations play a crucialcausal role in the development and enjoyment of autonomy and claimingthat such relations constitute autonomy (for discussion see Mackenzieand Stoljar, 2000b, 21–26; for a recent overview, see Mackenzie2014).
Stefanou, C., Perencevich, K., DiCinto, M., & Turner, J. (2004). Supporting autonomy in the classroom: Ways teachers encourage student decision making and ownership. Educational Psychologist, 39(2), 97–110.
(2007), The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis
“The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether or not God commands, desires or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that: (a) the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; and (b) robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis.